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The current study examined the relationship between uncertainty and supernatural 
beliefs, as well as the link between individual personality traits and supernatural beliefs. 
Participants were placed in four different prime conditions: self uncertainty, other 
uncertainty, self affirmation, or other affirmation. The current study was created due to 
the widespread belief in supernatural phenomena in America and its effect on society. 
Results suggest that uncertainty increases religious beliefs but not paranormal beliefs 
when the self is threatened. Results also suggest that narcissism and neuroticism have a 
negative correlation with paranormal beliefs, inconsistent with previous research. The 
search for meaning in life has a positive correlation with paranormal beliefs, which is 
consistent with past research in relation to religiosity. Further research needs to be 
conducted in order to understand the relationship between religious and paranormal 
beliefs and the way uncertainty affects belief, as well as the individual differences that 
make someone more likely to believe in the supernatural.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Belief in the paranormal has been an unwavering human custom predating the 
ancient Egyptians. Recently, however, scientific reasoning has become prominent and 
superstitious and paranormal beliefs have become less of a norm. Even with so many 
recent scientific advancements though, roughly two-thirds of Americans hold some 
paranormal belief (Baden, Mencken, & Baker, 2012, p. 164). So, in the modern era, what 
makes a person believe in the unscientific, and are these people certain of their beliefs?  
The term “paranormal,” in this study, refers to hypothesized processes or 
phenomena that conventional scientists deem, by principle, physically impossible or 
outside the realm of human capabilities (Thalbourne, 1982). Irwin (1993) claims that 
paranormal belief establishes a cognitive bias. Reality is filtered through this cognitive 
bias without threatening an individual’s emotional security. The way paranormal beliefs 
achieve this effect is by creating an illusion of control over events that are actually not 
controllable by the individual. This effect is created because paranormal beliefs create a 
framework for effectively structuring life events and experiences so that they appear 
comprehensible and able to be mastered (Irwin, 1993). 
 Many scholars have looked at predictors of paranormal beliefs such as social 
correlates (Rice, 2003), cognitive ability (Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002), psychopathology, 
and personality traits (Auton, Pope, & Seeger, 2003) using questionnaires, interviews, 
observation, and other investigative strategies. Scholars have concluded that paranormal 
beliefs serve many different roles, based on the many correlational studies that have been 
done. Shermer (1997) stated that people have these beliefs because they satisfy several 
motives such as consolation/comfort, immediate gratification, morality and meaning, 
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simplicity, and hope. It has further been proposed that certain paranormal beliefs may 
represent a cognitive defense against acceptance of the uncertainty of life events 
(Williams & Irwin, 1991). 
 Some of these studies that have been conducted to determine what personality 
traits correlate with belief in the paranormal indicate that high scores on scales measuring 
narcissism and religiosity are positively linked with belief in the paranormal (Tobacyk & 
Mitchell, 1987). In other work, Thalbourne, Dunbar, and Delin (1995) found that 
neuroticism and an external locus of control also correlate positively with paranormal 
belief.  
 Religious beliefs and paranormal beliefs also have been linked throughout the 
years. In fact, according to some researchers, the main difference between religious and 
paranormal beliefs is social acceptability (Irwin, 1993). Religious beliefs, like paranormal 
beliefs, involve accepting and attaching great value to things that can neither be seen nor 
verified (Vail et al., 2010). Religious beliefs are considered socially normative, due to the 
dimension of traditionalism (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006).  
Taking religion as an example of paranormal beliefs, Van den Bos, van Ameijde, 
and van Gorp (2006) found that personal uncertainty salience leads people to react with 
more anger and general negative affect toward antireligious statements, especially when 
personal uncertainty is emotionally threatening for them, and particularly when they 
consider themselves to be strongly religious. It appears that uncertainty may cause one to 
mask this uncertainty by increasing conviction in important beliefs and hardening 
attitudes towards those beliefs (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). 
Uncertainty can even cause increased self-reported religiosity (Wichman, 2010). Previous 
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research indicates that other paranormal beliefs are positively correlated with religious 
beliefs (Orenstein, 2002). Due to the similarity of religious and other paranormal beliefs, 
it is not implausible that non-religious paranormal beliefs would follow the same pattern 
that religious beliefs follow when primed with uncertainty.  
Uncertainty, or doubt, can be described as a state where cognitive representations 
are incompatible with personal experience or other information about the nature of reality 
(Weary, Tobin, & Edwards, 2010). Given that uncertainty is inherent in the world, it is 
thought that people possess uncertainty schemas, which contain thoughts, feelings and 
behaviors that are associated with uncertainty (Weary et al., 2010). These schemas can be 
activated situationally. For instance, evidence suggests that when primed with 
uncertainty, those with religious beliefs strengthen those beliefs to manage the 
uncertainty (Van den Bos et al., 2006), consistent with schema-driven cognitive 
structuring after uncertainty threat. This raises questions about whether this type of 
defense would also be present when participants are confronted with uncertainty before 
reporting on their paranormal beliefs.  
Higher uncertainty has been shown to be related to lower self-esteem, higher self-
handicapping, lower narcissism, and increased social anxiety. Of particular interest, 
uncertainty has been shown to increase religiosity, which other work has linked 
correlationally to paranormal beliefs.  It is believed that incorporating a system of 
paranormal beliefs into one’s cognitive framework theoretically allows an individual to 
structure events and experiences in life so that they appear comprehensible in some way 
and able to be mastered intellectually (Irwin, 1993). Psychological threats such as 
uncertainty may amplify this process.  
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 Another theory concerning the utility of paranormal beliefs is that, 
psychodynamically, there is a cognitive bias through which reality may be filtered. This 
bias does not threaten the individual’s sense of emotional security. Paranormal beliefs 
achieve this effect by creating an illusion of control over abnormal events or events that 
are deemed out of an individual’s control. This theory is based on the basic human 
psychological need to understand life events and have an assurance of order and meaning 
in the world (Irwin, 1993). For this reason, and because uncertainty is thought to threaten 
comfort, meaning, simplicity, and hope, this thesis will focus on how an uncertainty 
induction may trigger increased superstition. 
Uncertainty has been manipulated in a number of ways. Some researchers have 
created situations that threaten integrity, increase mortality salience, or increase temporal 
discontinuity (McGregor et al., 2001). I used an adaptation that builds on self-affirmation 
theory (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Self-affirmation theory predicts that people who have 
the opportunity to write about why their important values are important to them will be 
less reactive to many psychological threats. Research indicates that, in a wide variety of 
domains, self-affirmations effectively buffer people from the consequences of 
experiences that could otherwise trigger defensive responses (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). 
For the purpose of my thesis, a defensive response consists of an increase of religious and 
paranormal beliefs in reply to uncertainty. I predicted that situationally induced 
uncertainty would increase religious and paranormal beliefs, unless participants were 
buffered from the uncertainty using a self-affirmation task.  
This study used a 2 (self/others) x 2 (uncertainty/affirmation) design.  Participants 
were first asked to write about a values-related goal that they either found important (self) 
  
5 
or unimportant (other). Those in the uncertainty self condition, who described a goal that 
was important to them, explained a time they had uncertainty or doubts about living up to 
that goal. It was hypothesized that this would inspire the most threatening uncertainty in 
participants (Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011). Those in the uncertainty other 
condition, who described a goal that was unimportant to them, then explained a time 
when this goal may have been important to someone else; they also described uncertainty 
or doubts that others might have about living up to that goal. This manipulation was 
designed to make uncertainty more accessible, but not to be threatening to participants. 
Those in the affirmation self group described a goal that was important to them, and those 
in the affirmation other group described a goal that was unimportant to them. Those in 
the affirmation self group were asked to describe why their important goal was important, 
following standard self-affirmation instructions. Those in the affirmation other group 
were asked to describe why the goal they chose as unimportant would be important to 
someone else. Neither of these groups were asked about doubts that they had about these 
goals.  
I hypothesized that those completing the uncertainty self prime, in which an 
important value was threatened, would show the highest levels of paranormal belief. I 
expected that those completing the uncertainty other prime might show decreased 
paranormal belief, as uncertainty which is not threatening may cause more careful, 
analytic information processing (e.g. Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The group in which one’s 
own values were affirmed (affirmation self group) was expected to show the lowest levels 
of paranormal belief. I expected that the group in which others’ values were affirmed 
(affirmation other group) might show a slight amount of paranormal belief because 
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writing about why others might find a value to be important should not activate self-
affirmation.  
In addition to examining the effects of different manipulations on self-report 
paranormal beliefs, this study attempted to replicate previously established relationships 
and discover relationships between paranormal beliefs and certain personality traits. 
These traits included: narcissism (Raskin, Novacek, & Hogan, 1991), emotional response 
to uncertainty (Greco & Roger, 2003), locus of control (Spector et al., 2001), anxiety 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994), neuroticism (Scheier et al., 1994), self-esteem 
(Scheier et al., 1994), meaning in life (Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), and 
religiosity (Orenstein, 2002). It is important to consider these traits in relation to 
paranormal beliefs, because paranormal beliefs serve as a protection against the threat of 
self-doubt and serve to enhance emotional security (Irwin, 1993). These individual traits 
are related to these constructs. Several of these traits—neuroticism, anxiety, and low self-
esteem—have an inverse relationship with emotional security (Scheier et al., 1994). 
Narcissism has been proposed to enhance self-esteem by enabling grandiosity, which can 
protect one from self-doubt (Raskin et al., 1991). An internal locus of control, as well as 
having meaning in life, has been correlated with overall well-being, or a sense of security 
(Spector et al., 2001; Steger et al., 2006).  
Based on previous research (Van den Bos et al., 2006), it was hypothesized that 
those who have high levels of anxiety and neuroticism would have higher levels of 
paranormal beliefs. Those with an external locus of control might show higher levels of 
anxiety, due to their tendency to assume that outside forces control outcomes (Spector, 
1982). Similarly, previous research suggests that they would most likely show a higher 
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level of paranormal belief. In general, it was expected that previously identified correlates 
of paranormal beliefs would also be associated with paranormal beliefs in this study. 
Further, it was expected that these individual difference correlates would continue to 
predict paranormal beliefs under conditions when uncertainty had been induced. 
Consistent with past research, I predicted that higher levels of neuroticism, anxiety, self-
esteem, and narcissism, as well as an external locus of control, would demonstrate higher 
scores on the paranormal belief scales. In the following, I lay out the different measures I 
used in order to investigate this topic and explain how they were presented in the 
experiment, before presenting the results. 
In sum, I had both primary and secondary hypotheses. My primary hypothesis 
was that people primed with threatening uncertainty would show higher levels of 
paranormal belief. Conversely, those who had been affirmed would show relatively lower 
levels. Those exposed to non-threatening uncertainty or other-focused affirmations were 
not expected to show increased levels of paranormal beliefs.  
My secondary hypotheses referred to the expected correlations between individual 
differences and religious and non-religious supernatural beliefs. It was expected that 
positive correlations would be found between religious and non-religious supernatural 
beliefs and anxiety, neuroticism, narcissism, meaning in life, and an external locus of 
control. It was expected that negative correlations would be found between religious and 
non-religious supernatural beliefs and self-esteem.  
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MATERIALS AND METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
A total of 182 undergraduate students were recruited from undergraduate 
psychology courses at Western Kentucky University using the departmental Study Board 
website. There were 46 males and 136 females in the study (M age = 18.60, SD = 3.20).  
Before entering the lab, participants were asked to complete an online prescreen 
involving a series of questionnaires. This prescreen is referred to as Time 1 data in the 
following descriptions and was completed at least one day before Time 2 data was 
collected. When participants entered the lab at Time 2, they were seated in front of a 
computer and asked to sign a consent form. This form provided both consent and a 
measure of implicit self-esteem, discussed below. Participants were then asked to 
complete a series of questionnaires that they were told would measure college students’ 
traits and beliefs. Presented below, in order of importance in relation to primary and 
secondary hypotheses, are the materials that participants completed.  
 
 
VARIABLES RELATING TO PRIMARY HYPOTHESIS 
 
Paranormal Beliefs 
This study used the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS; Tobacyk, 2004) 
and the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993) to determine 
participants’ belief in the paranormal. Responses to the 26 items of Tobacyk’s R-PBS 
were made on a true/false scale at Time 1 and a 7-point Likert scale at Time 2. These 
seven choices ranged from strongly disagree through uncertain to strongly agree. 
Examples of these questions are “Witches do exist” and “The Loch Ness monster of 
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Scotland exists.” Scores were derived for the full scale and for seven separate subscales. 
These seven subscales are: traditional religious belief, psi belief, witchcraft, superstition, 
spiritualism, extraordinary life forms, and precognition. Tobacyk and Milford (1983) 
reported acceptable reliability and validity using the original form of the PBS. The test-
retest reliability for the subscales was improved in the revision (.71-.95 range for each 
dimension), but the internal consistency of the entire revised PBS was not reported 
(Tobacyk, 2004). 
Thalbourne’s ASGS has 18 items and has a forced choice response of “true” or 
“false” to statements of paranormal belief at Time 1 and the same 7-point Likert scale at 
Time 2. These statements include “I believe in the existence of ESP” and “I have had at 
least one dream that came true and which (I believe) was not just a coincidence.” A 
“false” response scores zero points, and a “true” response scores two points. The sum of 
the points given to the 18 items is the total ASGS score, ranging from 0 through 36. The 
scale measures belief in ESP, life after death, psychokinesis, and any perceived 
experiences of the three. It is widely used, and it has proven validity and reliability 
(Thalbourne & Delin, 1993). In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for the ASGS was .64 at 
Time 1 and .95 at Time 2. Cronbach’s Alpha for the PBS was .82 at Time 1 and .90 at 
Time 2. True/False and 7-point Likert versions of the ASGS and the PBS can be found in 
Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.  
 
Religiosity 
 A strong positive correlation exists between paranormal belief and religious 
beliefs (Orenstein, 2002). Previous studies (Van den Bos et al., 2006) have found that 
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salience of personal uncertainty may lead people to react with more anger and general 
negative affective reactions toward antireligious statements, especially when they believe 
personal uncertainty to be an emotionally threatening experience and particularly when 
they consider themselves to be strongly religious. A measure of religiosity was included 
to compare the findings of the current study with those of previous studies. Religiosity 
was measured after the uncertainty induction to replicate previous research as well as 
acting as a comparison for the measure of paranormal beliefs.  
To measure religiosity without assuming that the participant was religious, the 
Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SCSRFQ; Plante & Boccaccini, 
1997) was used. The SCSRFQ is a 10-item measure that uses a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Items on the questionnaire include “I 
look to my faith as a source for inspiration” and “I enjoy being around other who share 
my faith.” The SCSRFQ was found to have high internal reliability (α = .95) and split-
half reliability (r = .92) (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997). The SCSRFQ was also included in 
both Time 1 and Time 2. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for the SCSRFQ was .94. A 
True/False and 4-point Likert version of the SCSRFQ can be found in Appendix D.  
 
MANIPULATED VARIABLES 
This was a 2 (self/other) X 2 (uncertainty/affirmation) design in which 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. To review, participants 
first picked either their most important (self condition) or least important value (other 
condition) to write about. Participants in the self-condition, who had picked their most 
important value, went on to write either about doubts they had about this value 
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(uncertainty) or about why this value was important to them (affirmation). Participants in 
the other-condition, who had picked their least important value, went on to write either 
about doubts another person might have about achieving this value (uncertainty), or 
wrote about why another person might find this value to be important (affirmation).  
Table 1 shows the four conditions: uncertainty self, uncertainty other, affirmation 
self, and affirmation other. Within the table are the prompts given to each condition, 
tailored to induce uncertainty or self-affirmation by making important or unimportant 
goals salient, then inducing a physical and emotional response to these goals. These 
prompts were explained to participants by claiming that those conducting the study were 
“interested in perceptions of your goals” or “interested in perceptions of others’ goals.”  
 
Table 1. Description of Manipulations 
 
 Self (always picked most 
important goal) 
Other (always picked least 
important goal) 
Uncertainty “Please tell us about some 
serious uncertainty or 
doubts you have about 
living up to this goal.” How 
does this make you feel 
physically and emotionally?  
“Please tell us about some 
serious uncertainty or 
doubts ANOTHER 
PERSON might have about 
living up to this goal.” How 
would he/she feel physically 
and emotionally? 
Affirmation “Please explain a little bit 
about why this goal is 
important to you, 
personally.”  How do you 
feel physically and 
emotionally when you think 
of why this goal is 
important to you? 
“Please explain why this 
goal might be important to 
someone else.”  How would 
he/she feel physically and 
emotionally when thinking 
of why this goal is 
important to him/her? 
 
 
To help them choose their value-relevant goals, participants were provided with a 
list to choose from. Value-relevant goals participants chose from include “Deciding your 
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own actions—not being under another’s influence” and “Being a reliable, trustworthy 
member of your group.” The full list of goals participants could choose from is provided 
in Appendix E, as well as the wording of the uncertainty and control groups’ materials. 
The goals were chosen from a set of 19 identified by recent research (Schwartz et al., 
2012). Some of these basic individual values which inspired the goals include: hedonism, 
security, power, conformity, self-direction, and humility.  
 The affirmation conditions were based on McGregor et al. (2001) and McGregor 
(2004), who found that a post-uncertainty self-affirmation task blocked compensatory 
responses to uncertainty. Self-affirmation is the act of protecting self-integrity by 
confirming alternative frameworks of meaning (Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010).  
According to Proulx et al. (2010), people are motivated to organize their thoughts and 
experiences into mental representations of expected associations. When these frameworks 
of associations are threatened, people experience a state of arousal which motivates them 
to regain meaning by supporting another meaning framework. Affirming an alternative 
framework reduces these feelings of threat and makes participants feel “whole” (Heine, 
Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Those who participated in either of the two affirmation primes 
were not asked about their doubts as they were in the uncertainty primes. In the 
uncertainty prime conditions, instead of using self-affirmation to make people feel 
“whole” after a threat, the self-affirmation activation was used simply make certain goals 
salient before activating uncertainty about these goals. 
 
 
  
  
13 
VARIABLES RELATING TO SECONDARY HYPOTHESES  
 
Trait Anxiety  
 Anxiety is distress or uneasiness caused by the fear of danger or misfortune. 
There is some evidence that superstition is associated with trait anxiety (Wolfradt, 1997). 
Trait anxiety is a person’s general tendency to perceive situations as threatening. This 
differs from state anxiety, which is a temporary condition experienced in certain 
situations. In this study, I looked at both state and trait anxiety and their relation to 
paranormal beliefs before and after the uncertainty inductions. The State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) was used for this 
purpose. 
 The trait questions of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) include 20 items 
based on a four-point Likert scale that ranges from almost never to almost always. Trait 
anxiety questions include “I make decisions easily” and “I take disappointments so 
keenly I can’t get them out of my mind.” The internal consistency coefficients for the 
STAI have ranged from .86 to .95, and test-retest reliability coefficients have ranged from 
.65 to .75. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for the trait items of the STAI was .91. The 
trait questions of the STAI are included in Appendix F. 
 
State Anxiety  
 Previous research on uncertainty (Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008) has shown 
that brief distraction tasks are necessary before compensatory responses to uncertainty 
can be observed. Because of this, the state anxiety questions of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) were included immediately after the 
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uncertainty induction. The state anxiety questions of the STAI include 20 items based on 
a four-point Likert scale that ranges from almost never to almost always. State anxiety 
questions include “I am tense” and “I feel upset.” The internal consistency coefficients 
for the STAI have ranged from .86 to .95, and test-retest reliability coefficients have 
ranged from .65 to .75. In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for the state items of the STAI 
was .69. The state anxiety questions of the STAI are included in Appendix G. 
 
Self-Esteem  
 Self-esteem is a person’s overall impression of his/her own worth. Self-esteem is 
thought to moderate responses to threats such as uncertainty. Several studies have shown 
that people with low self-esteem only occasionally are able to react to threat in esteem-
protective ways (VanDellen, Campbell, Hoyle, & Bradfield, 2011). People with high self-
esteem engage in more compensating (minimizing the importance of negative self-related 
information or refocusing attention to other information to evaluate the self) reactions to 
threat than those with low self-esteem (VanDellen et al., 2011). 
There are different types of self-esteem. Implicit self-esteem is the unconscious 
evaluation of worth, while explicit self-esteem is the conscious evaluation of worth. In 
this study, a number of measures of self-esteem were administered. Single-item measures 
of implicit and explicit self-esteem were assessed at the beginning of Time 2, and the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) was administered at the end of the 
Time 2 session, in order to detect any changes in self-esteem after the uncertainty prime.  
Implicit self-esteem was measured using the signature effect (Zweigenhaft & 
Marlowe, 1973). This consisted of asking the participant to sign a consent form at the 
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beginning of the Time 2 session. Those with higher levels of implicit self-esteem were 
expected to have a larger signature than those with lower levels of implicit self-esteem 
(Zweigenhaft & Marlowe, 1973). This measure is correlated with other measures of self-
esteem, such as the Tennessee Self-concept Scale (Stewart, 1977). The Single-Item Self-
Esteem Scale (SISE; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001) was also administered, 
which measures explicit self-esteem, and consists of the true-false item “I have high self-
esteem.” The SISE has been shown to have correlations with the RSE ranging from .74-
.80.  
 The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) was administered later 
in the study to detect any changes in self-esteem over the course of the study. The RSE 
has 10 items and includes statements such as “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” 
The scale is rated on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
Several studies have reported test-retest reliabilities for the RSE that range from .72 to 
.88, while the internal consistency had an alpha coefficient of .83 (VanDellen et al., 
2011). In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for the RSE was .90. The RSE items are included 
in Appendix H. 
 
Neuroticism 
 Neuroticism is a personality trait characterized by anxiety, aggression, and 
emotional instability. These qualities suggest that the mechanisms necessary for 
successful defense against existential concerns, and possibly uncertainty of beliefs, would 
be more difficult for individuals high in neuroticism (Goldenberg et al., 2006). This 
means that those high in neuroticism may be especially dependent on belief systems 
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which provide unfalsifiable structure to their worlds. In keeping with this idea, a 
relationship has been found between neuroticism and belief in the paranormal 
(Thalbourne et al., 1995). It is posited that those with higher neuroticism scores will react 
more strongly to an uncertainty induction, causing higher levels of paranormal belief. To 
measure neuroticism, I used the short form of the Neuroticism subscale of the Eysenk’s 
Personality Questionnaire—Revised (EPQR-S; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985).   
 The neuroticism subscale of the EPQR-S included 12 dichotomous (yes or no) 
questions. Higher total scores revealed higher levels of neuroticism. Examples of these 
questions include “Are you a worrier?” and “Are your feelings easily hurt?” The subscale 
has been shown to have a good validity, and the reliability ranges from .78 to .80 (Sato, 
2005). In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for the EPQR-S was .79. The EPQR-S is included 
in Appendix I.  
 
Locus of Control 
Those who believe personal outcomes are contingent largely on their own 
behavior and attributes are said to have an internal locus of control. People with external 
locus of control, on the other hand, believe personal outcomes are governed 
predominantly by other powerful forces (conspiracies, luck, chance, etc.). Most 
psychologists agree that beliefs are held because they serve significant needs of the 
individual, such as maintaining a sense of control (Irwin, 1993). Some researchers 
believe that paranormal believers have a greater need for a sense of control over their 
world than non-paranormal believers. Irwin (2009) stated that paranormal beliefs, 
“whether realistic or delusory, can promote psychological wellbeing by acting as a buffer 
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against the harsh realities of the world (p.104).” These illusions may be especially useful 
when an individual receives negative feedback or is threatened. It follows that 
paranormal believers’ evident belief in an external locus of control may help make sense 
of uncontrollable life events. The appeal of paranormal beliefs may be that they produce 
some assurance that at least some life events might be subject to direct paranormal 
intervention, and thus can indirectly be controlled (Irwin, 1993).  
The Locus of Control Scale (LCS) consists of 29 items (six of which are filler 
questions). It is a forced-answer questionnaire, including two statements per item. The 
participant chooses with which statement he/she agrees the most (Rotter, 1966). An 
example of this is would be “In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced 
by the good ones” versus “Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, 
laziness, or all three.” Test-retest reliability has ranged from .70 to .80, and alpha 
coefficients have been reported to range from 0.65 to 0.79 (Rotter, 1966). In this study, 
Cronbach's Alpha for the LCS was .02. The LCS is included in Appendix J.  
 
Narcissism 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual—Fourth Revised (DSM-IV), 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) is characterized by a pattern of grandiosity, a 
need for admiration, and a lack of empathy. These characteristics usually emerge by early 
adulthood (APA, 2000). It seems to be confirmed by several studies, showing that after 
negative feedback, narcissistic individuals are prone to negative reactions directed toward 
others (e.g. anger), whereas people scoring low in narcissism tend to react to this same 
type of feedback with negative emotions directed toward the self (e.g. depression). 
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Narcissists tend to blame others rather than themselves for conflicts and problems 
(Patrick, 1990; Sandowsky, 1995). Due to these findings, it is considered a possibility 
that those high in narcissistic traits will be more likely to believe in the paranormal 
because they should want to blame negative experiences associated with uncertainty on 
something that they perceive to be outside of their control. This pattern of attributions 
serves to protect their inflated self-perceptions.  
 The Narcissistic Personality Inventory-16 (NPI-16) includes 16 forced-choice 
items. The NPI consists of seven aspects: authority, exhibitionism, vanity, superiority, 
exploitativeness, entitlement, and self-sufficiency. Participants choose either the 
narcissistic response (e.g., ‘‘I think I am a special person’’) or the non-narcissistic 
response (e.g., ‘‘I am no better or no worse than most people’’). The 16 items are then 
added together. Higher total scores indicate higher levels of narcissism. The NPI-16 has 
an alpha of .72 and correlates with the 40-item NPI scale at r = .90 (Ames, Rose, & 
Anderson, 2006). In this study, Cronbach's Alpha for NPI-16 was .74. This scale is 
included in Appendix K.  
 
Meaning in Life 
The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger et al., 2006) measures the 
presence of, and the search for, meaning in life. An assurance of order and meaning in 
life is thought to be essential for emotional security and psychological adjustment (Irwin, 
1993). The MLQ is divided into two subtests, one measuring the presence of meaning in 
life and another measuring the search for meaning. This measure indicates psychological 
well-being and a sense of purpose. The MLQ has known relationships with religiosity. 
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Individuals that score higher on religiosity scales also score higher on the presence of 
meaning subscale (Steger et al.,2006). Inclusion of the MLQ allowed investigation of 
whether or not this pattern also applies to paranormal beliefs.   
The MLQ is comprised of 10 items and uses a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from Absolutely untrue to Absolutely true. Examples of these questions include “I 
understand my life’s meaning” and “I am always searching for something that makes my 
life feel significant.” The MLQ has been shown to have good test-retest reliability (r = 
.70-.73) and internal consistency (α = .81-.92) (Steger et al., 2006). In this study, 
Cronbach's Alpha for the MLQ was .62. The MLQ may be found in Appendix L. 
 
Emotional Uncertainty  
  The Emotional Responses to Uncertainty scale (UR-E; Greco & Roger, 2003) is a 
self-report measure that assesses the extent to which uncertainty is distressing to the 
individual, also referred to as uncertainty sensitivity. In this study, uncertainty sensitivity 
was used as a determinant of the strength of reaction a participant might have as a result 
of an uncertainty prime.  
The UR-E is a 15-item measure that uses a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 
never to always. Items on the questionnaire include “Sudden changes make me feel 
upset” and “Uncertainty frightens me.” The UR-E has been found to have adequate 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Greco & Roger, 2001). In this study, 
Cronbach's Alpha for the UR-E was .92. The UR-E can be found in Appendix M, and a 
complete list of measures and the order they were presented at both Time 1 and Time 2 
can be found in the following tables. 
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Table 2. Order of Time 1 Measures 
Order of 
Appearance 
Measures 
1 Emotional Response to Uncertainty Scale (UR-E) 
2 The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; 
True/False) 
3 Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith 
Questionnaire (SCSRFQ; True/False) 
4 Trait Anxiety (STAI-T) 
5 The Paranormal Belief Scale-Revised (PBS-R; 
True/False) 
6 The Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MLQ) 
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Table 3. Order of Time 2 Measures 
Order of 
Appearance 
Measures 
1 Self-Esteem-Implicit 
2 Self-Esteem-Explicit 
3 Neuroticism: Eysenk Personality Questionnaire-
Revised Short Form (EPQR-S) 
4 Locus of Control Scale (LCS) 
5 Narcissistic Personality Inventory-16 (NPI-16) 
6 Primes  
7 State Anxiety (STAI-S) 
8 The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; 7-Point 
Likert) 
9 The Paranormal Belief Scale-Revised (PBS-R; 7-
Point Likert) 
10 Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith 
Questionnaire (SCSRFQ; 4-Point Likert) 
11 Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE) 
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RESULTS 
ANALYSIS STRATEGY   
 Time 2 outcome variables were regressed on their respective standardized Time 1 
measures, the dummy-coded uncertainty threat variable (uncertainty/affirmation), 
dummy-coded self/other relevance, standardized emotional uncertainty (uncertainty 
sensitivity), and all interactions. “High” and “low” scores on the variables are noted as +1 
and -1 SD from the mean, respectively. In keeping with the primary hypothesis, it was 
expected that the uncertainty self condition would show the highest level of paranormal 
beliefs and religiosity because it would inspire the most threatening uncertainty in 
participants (Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011). 
 Following these initial analyses, correlational analyses were conducted using 
previously established personality correlates of paranormal and religiosity beliefs as 
additional predictors, in addition to the self/other and uncertainty/affirmation factors. 
Finally, self-esteem was examined in two ways. First, I examined if implicit self-esteem, 
as measured at the beginning of the experiment, predicted self-esteem as measured by the 
RSE differentially based on the uncertainty induction. Second, I examined whether the 
inclusion of implicit and explicit self-esteem helped to predict paranormal and religious 
belief scores when considered simultaneously in a regression including value importance 
and uncertainty as dichotomous factors. 
 
ANALYSIS OUTCOMES 
 Sixteen participants were removed from the study based on written responses that 
indicated that participants did not follow instructions or did not take the study seriously, 
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leaving 166 participants (44 males and 122 females; M age = 18.90 years, SD age = 1.34 
years).  
Two of the outcome variables showed significant effects. First, the SCSRFQ was 
analyzed using an ANOVA, though no significant effects were noted. Descriptive 
statistics for the value of the SCSRFQ in each condition are presented in table 4.  
 
Table 4. Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire Descriptives  
 M SD N 
Uncertainty self 2.96 1.06 40 
Uncertainty other 3.06 1.00 45 
Affirmation self 3.07 0.98 41 
Affirmation other 3.18 0.85 43 
 
Following this analysis, I ran the regression model as described above. The 
SCSRFQ, in this instance, showed a significant 3-way interaction between 
uncertainty/affirmation, self/other, and pre-uncertainty SCSRFQ (t (1,165) = 2.32, B = 
.30, p= .022, η2partial = .035). This interaction is shown in Figure 1, and output data can be 
found in Appendix N.  
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Figure 1. Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire Interactions 
   
   
 
The nature of this interaction indicated that for individuals lower in SCSRFQ, the 
uncertainty and affirmation conditions had opposite effects, depending on whether 
participants were in the self or the other condition. In the self condition, uncertainty was 
relatively higher than the affirmation, consistent with the idea that uncertainty threat 
could increase belief in the supernatural. In the other condition, uncertainty was 
moderately lower, indicating that in the absence of personal threat, uncertainty alone does 
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not trigger reactive compensation. Follow up analyses showed that relative to the self 
condition, low religiosity participants in the other condition showed higher religiosity if 
they had been affirmed, t (1,165) = 3.10, B = .44, p= .003, η2partial = .058. No other simple 
effects comparisons reached conventional levels of significance. The observed findings 
are consistent with the findings of McGregor, Haji, Nash, & Teper, (2008) and Wichman 
(2010), who found that religious beliefs will increase when influenced by uncertainty 
threat. 
  Mirroring the findings on the SCSRFQ, no significant effects were noted when 
using an ANOVA to analyze effects between conditions on the ASGS. Descriptive 
statistics for the values of the ASGS in the different conditions are provided in Table 5. 
However, like the SCSRFQ, the ASGS also showed significant effects when analyzed 
using regression. In this case, the three-way interaction was between 
uncertainty/affirmation, self/other, and uncertainty sensitivity, t (1,165) = 2.5, B = .60, p= 
.015, η2partial = .039. These results are depicted in Figure 2, and output data can be found 
in Appendix O. 
 
Table 5. Australian Sheep-Goat Scale Descriptives 
 M SD N 
Uncartainty self 2.15 0.97 40 
Uncertainty other 2.43 1.53 45 
Affirmation self 2.28 1.04 41 
Affirmation other 2.42 1.32 43 
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Figure 2. Australian Sheep-Goat Scale Interactions 
 
    
    
 
 
Follow-up analyses to break down this interaction showed that the largest 
apparent difference between conditions (between affirmation and uncertainty conditions 
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(1,165) = -1.70, B = -.44, p= .08, η2partial = .02). Although the overall 3-way interaction 
was significant, decomposition of the interaction showed that its components were not 
significantly different. 
 Correlational analyses were performed to determine if there was a link between 
each of the independent variables and the ASGS, PBS, and SCSRFQ, as well as in 
between these three dependent variables. Results indicated that the ASGS and the PBS 
were correlated at r = .638 at Time 1 and r = .756 at Time 2. The PBS scale was not 
correlated with the SCSRFQ, though the ASGS did show a negative correlation with the 
SCSRFQ at both Time 1 (r = -.204) and Time 2 (r = -.254).   
It was also hypothesized that initial implicit and explicit self-esteem measures 
would predict scores on the RSE at the end of the study, but no correlations were found. 
There were few correlations of interest, but the PBS was correlated with neuroticism at r 
= -.179. The ASGS was correlated with the MLQ at r = .171 and narcissism at r = -.160. 
Cronbach’s Alphas for each of these measures can be found in the Method section. The 
SCSRFQ was not significantly correlated with any of the other variables. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study was meant to detect any differences in responses to uncertainty 
between individuals with various beliefs. It was also meant to investigate specific traits 
that may govern the degree to which someone is a paranormal believer.  
I expected that religious and paranormal beliefs would increase due to the 
influence of uncertainty. Overall, those exposed to the uncertainty prime should have 
shown a higher level of paranormal belief in comparison to those who were not primed 
with uncertainty. However, this effect was only found in relation to religious beliefs. This 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction between level of religiosity and 
uncertainty/affirmation. The nature of the interaction suggested that uncertainty and 
affirmation only affected reported religiosity if participants were already low in religious 
beliefs. The lack of compensatory reactions to uncertainty on paranormal beliefs may 
indicate that paranormal beliefs are not as strongly held as religious beliefs. Supernatural 
beliefs that are weakly held cannot be expected to produce the same compensatory 
benefits as supernatural beliefs that are strongly held, such as religious beliefs, which are 
more normatively accepted (c.f. McGregor, 2001; Steele, 1983).  
The results of the ASGS interaction with uncertainty suggest effects opposing the 
original hypothesis. Judging by the unexpected effect, as well as lack of effects on the 
highly correlated PBS, the results from the ASGS are possibly the results of a type I 
error. It is possible that the ASGS simply measures beliefs that appear to be less strongly 
held than more normative religiosity beliefs. For this reason, ASGS- and PBS-measured 
superstition may not have had the importance required to offer an effective compensatory 
response to uncertainty.  
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If the effects in the self, high uncertainty sensitivity group on ASGS levels are not 
the result of a type I error, they could be explained by using the self-validation hypothesis 
(Petty, Briñol, & Tormala, 2002). The self-validation hypothesis states that uncertainty or 
confidence, whichever is present, has an impact on whatever cognitions are cognitively 
active. According to the self-validation hypothesis (Petty et al., 2002), uncertainty 
reduces the influence of accessible primary cognitions on someone’s judgment, whereas 
confidence increases the influence of accessible primary cognitions.  
Consistent with past research, it was predicted that higher levels of neuroticism, 
anxiety, and narcissism would be associated with higher scores on the paranormal belief 
scales (PBS and ASGS).  Both neuroticism and narcissism, however, were negatively 
correlated with at least one measure of supernatural beliefs, the reverse of what was 
expected. It was also predicted that those with an external locus of control would have 
higher paranormal belief scores, though LCS scores were not correlated with any of the 
dependent variables. It also was hypothesized that higher paranormal belief would be 
associated with higher self-esteem scores, though these effects were not seen. 
Returning to the unexpected findings on the ASGS, in keeping with the logic of 
the self-validation hypothesis, a negative correlation of the ASGS with neuroticism could 
be explained by a meta-cognitive perspective on secondary uncertainty (Wichman et al., 
2010). The combination of chronic uncertainty, which is likely to be exhibited by 
neurotic individuals, and situational forms of uncertainty such as the uncertainty prime in 
this study might have decreased uncertainty through mechanisms suggested to account 
for “double doubt” effects as seen in Wichman et al. (2010). This may also explain the 
negative correlation of the ASGS with narcissism. Many theorists believe that narcissists’ 
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self-esteem is very fragile, possibly causing chronic uncertainty, and that they exhibit 
neurotic behaviors because of this vulnerability (APA, 2000). Unfortunately, though this 
is an intriguing explanation for the results of the uncertainty conditions, it does not 
explain the findings from the affirmation conditions, in which people should not have 
experienced the double doubt phenomenon.  
There were several limitations to this study. A greater number of participants may 
have helped researchers observe greater significance in the existing trends. These trends 
were consistent with my hypotheses in relation to religiosity but not to paranormal 
beliefs. Participants also may have represented a relatively elite group; paranormal belief 
was low in general, possibly because young, college-educated students are less likely to 
believe in paranormal phenomena. Future studies might investigate the beliefs of 
different age and socioeconomic groups. The study was also somewhat long, possibly 
resulting in the boredom of the participants. I attempted to mitigate this possibility by 
breaking the study into a Time 1 online pre-screen and a Time 2 in-lab survey. Despite 
this precaution, the length still may have resulted in boredom or fatigue, reducing the 
validity of responses. 
 Another limitation is the possibility that practice effects may have influenced 
how participants responded on the ASGS, PBS, and SCSRFQ after the uncertainty prime. 
Participants may have realized they had answered similar questions at Time 1, and 
answered the Time 2 questions according to how they answered the Time 1 questions. 
However, this seems unlikely, as a different response scale was used at Time 1. I used 
true/false at Time 1, and Likert scales at Time 2.  
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For future research, it is recommended and encouraged that studies follow-up and 
further examine the relationship between uncertainty and paranormal beliefs by arranging 
the main manipulations before the measures of individual differences, or by measuring 
individual differences at a more completely separate time (i.e. days or weeks in advance) 
from the main manipulations. Additional studies should also be conducted to reevaluate 
the correlation between individual differences and belief in the supernatural, because 
unexpectedly, none of these independent variables were correlated with more than one of 
the supernatural belief scales.  
In conclusion, this study hypothesized that uncertainty primes would increase 
levels of religious and paranormal beliefs. Findings from this study supported the 
hypothesis in relation to religious beliefs but not paranormal beliefs. The study also 
hypothesized correlations between supernatural beliefs and the following: narcissism, 
locus of control, uncertainty sensitivity, anxiety, neuroticism, self-esteem, and meaning 
in life. The PBS was negatively correlated with neuroticism, while the ASGS was 
positively correlated with the search for meaning in life and negatively correlated with 
narcissism. No specific individual traits were correlated with religiosity.  
These qualifications aside, this study conceptually replicated results found by 
Wichman (2010) and McGregor et al. (2008) in relation to uncertainty’s effect on 
religiosity, showing a significant increase in religiosity when self uncertainty was 
induced. It has paved the way for future research concerning uncertainty’s effect on 
paranormal beliefs, as well as the individual traits that may make individuals more prone 
to believe in the supernatural. Future research could do more to explain why humans, 
even in modern times, feel the need to believe in what cannot be explained.   
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APPENDIX A: INFORMED CONSENT AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Informed Consent 
  
Investigator: Kelly McCoy; Western Kentucky University, Department of Psychology 
You are being asked to participate in a project conducted through Western Kentucky University. The 
University requires that you give your agreement to participate in this project. 
  
The purpose of this project, procedures to be used, potential benefits and possible risks to participating in 
this study are briefly described below. Please read this explanation and contact the investigator with any 
questions you may have. 
  
If you then decide to participate in the project, you may print a copy of this form for your own records if you 
wish. 
Please indicate that you will participate in this study under your own free will by selecting the yes response 
bubble, then click the forward button to begin the survey. 
  
1.  Nature and Purpose of the Project: The purpose of this project is to investigate the attitudes and beliefs 
of Western Kentucky University students. 
  
2.  Explanation of Procedures:  You will be asked to take a survey administered online. This survey will take 
approximately 30  minutes to complete. 
 
3. Discomfort and Risks: There is no foreseeable risk of harm or discomfort; any foreseeable risk is no more 
than inconvenience or those experienced from normal computer usage. 
  
4.  Benefits:  A better understanding of situational attitudes and beliefs may result from this research. 
 
5. Confidentiality: Confidentiality of the participants will be maintained at all times since this information is 
not asked for in the survey.  Results of the survey will be kept on the principal investigator's password 
protected university computer.   
  
6. Refusal/Withdrawal:  Refusal to participate in this study will have no effect on any future services you may 
be entitled to from the University.  Anyone who agrees to participate in this study is free to withdraw from the 
study at any time with no penalty. 
 
You understand also that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental procedure, and 
you believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the known and potential but 
unknown risks. 
 
I have read, understood, and, if desired, printed or saved a copy of the above consent form and desire of my 
own free will to participate in this study. 
 
Demographics: 
 
Age: 
 
Gender: 
 
Religion: 
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APPENDIX B: THE PARANORMAL BELIEF SCALE-REVISED (PBS-R; 
TRUE/FALSE) 
 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale 
________________________________________________________________________
___________ 
Please select true or false to indicate whether you agree or disagree with that item. Use 
the 
numbers as indicated below. There are no right or wrong answers. This is a sample of 
your own beliefs and attitudes. Thank you. 
 
1 = true,2 = false 
 
1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die. 
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces. 
3. Black magic really exists. 
4. Black cats can bring bad luck. 
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection). 
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists. 
7. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future. 
8. There is a devil. 
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist. 
10. Witches do exist. 
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. 
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body. 
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists. 
14. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future. 
15. I believe in God 
16. A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object. 
17. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons. 
18. The number “13” is unlucky. 
19. Reincarnation does occur. 
20. There is life on other planets. 
21. Some psychics can accurately predict the future. 
22. There is a heaven and a hell. 
23. Mind reading is not possible. 
24. There are actual cases of witchcraft. 
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead. 
26. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future. 
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PARANORMAL BELIEF SCALE-REVISED (PBS-R; 7-POINT LIKERT) 
 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Please put a number next to each item to indicate how much you agree or disagree with 
that item. Use the 
numbers as indicated below. There are no right or wrong answers. This is a sample of 
your own beliefs and attitudes. Thank you. 
 
1=Strongly Disagree 2=Moderately Disagree 3=Slightly Disagree 
4=Uncertain 5=Slightly Agree 6=Moderately Agree 7=Strongly Agree 
 
1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die. 
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces. 
3. Black magic really exists. 
4. Black cats can bring bad luck. 
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection). 
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists. 
7. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future. 
8. There is a devil. 
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist. 
10. Witches do exist. 
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. 
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body. 
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists. 
14. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future. 
15. I believe in God 
16. A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object. 
17. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons. 
18. The number “13” is unlucky. 
19. Reincarnation does occur. 
20. There is life on other planets. 
21. Some psychics can accurately predict the future. 
22. There is a heaven and a hell. 
23. Mind reading is not possible. 
24. There are actual cases of witchcraft. 
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead. 
26. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future. 
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APPENDIX C: THE AUSTRALIAN SHEEP-GOAT SCALE (ASGS; TRUE/FALSE) 
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AUSTRALIAN SHEEP-GOAT SCALE (ASGS; 7-POINT LIKERT) 
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APPENDIX D: SANTA CLARA STRENGTH OF RELIGIOUS FAITH 
QUESTIONNAIRE (SCSRFQ; TRUE/FALSE)  
 
Please answer the following questions about religious faith using true or false.  
 
1 = true   2 = false 
 
1. My religious faith is extremely important to me. 
2. I pray daily. 
3. I look to my faith as a source of inspiration. 
4. I look to my faith as providing meaning and purpose in my life. 
5. I consider myself active in my faith or church. 
6. My faith is an important part of who I am as a person. 
7. My relationship with God is extremely important to me. 
8. I enjoy being around others who share my faith. 
9. I look to my faith as a source of comfort. 
 
 
 
SANTA CLARA STRENGTH OF RELIGIOUS FAITH QUESTIONNAIRE (SCSRFQ; 
4-POINT LIKERT)  
 
Please answer the following questions about religious faith using the scale below. 
Indicate the level of agreement (or disagreement) for each statement. 
 
1 = strongly disagree      2 = disagree       3 = agree      4 = strongly agree 
 
1. My religious faith is extremely important to me. 
2. I pray daily. 
3. I look to my faith as a source of inspiration. 
4. I look to my faith as providing meaning and purpose in my life. 
5. I consider myself active in my faith or church. 
6. My faith is an important part of who I am as a person. 
7. My relationship with God is extremely important to me. 
8. I enjoy being around others who share my faith. 
9. I look to my faith as a source of comfort. 
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APPENDIX E: PRIME CONDITIONS 
 
Uncertainty self: 
 
The following is a list of goals that many people have at different times. As part of a personality 
measure we are validating, we would like you to look at these goals and think about which one is 
most important to you at this point in your life. We then will ask you to tell us a little about your 
important goal at this time. 
  
1.       Deciding your own actions -- not being under other’s influence. 
2.       Being committed to equality, justice, and protection for all people. 
3.       Success according to social standards 
4.       Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions 
5.       Being a reliable and trustworthy member of your group 
  
We are interested in perceptions of your goals. 
  
Please select what you feel is your most important goal at this point in time. Several of the listed 
goals may be important to you, but please select the most important one for you right now. Please 
type this in the box. 
 
 
Continuing to think about the most important goal you have right now, please tell us about some 
serious uncertainty or doubts you have about living up to this goal. 
 
 
Now, please share with us how you physically feel when you have doubts and uncertainties about 
this goal. How do you feel? What emotions do you have? 
 
 
Uncertainty other: 
 
The following is a list of goals that many people have at different times. As part of a personality 
measure we are validating, we would like you to look at these goals and think about which one is 
LEAST important to you at this point in your life. We then will ask you to tell us a little about your 
least important goal at this time. 
  
1.       Deciding your own actions -- not being under other’s influence. 
2.       Being committed to equality, justice, and protection for all people. 
3.       Success according to social standards 
4.       Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions 
5.       Being a reliable and trustworthy member of your group 
  
We are interested in perceptions of others’ goals. 
  
Please select what you feel is your least important goal at this point in time. Several of the listed 
goals may be not be very important to you, but please select the LEAST IMPORTANT one for you 
right now. Please type this in the box. 
 
Continuing to think about the LEAST IMPORTANT goal you have right now, please tell us about 
some serious uncertainty or doubts ANOTHER PERSON might have about living up to this goal. 
 
Now, please share with us how you think someone would physically feel when he/she has doubts 
and uncertainties about this goal. How would he/she feel? What emotions would he/she have? 
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Affirmation self: 
 
The following is a list of goals that many people have at different times. As part of a personality 
measure we are validating, we would like you to look at these goals and think about which one is 
most important to you at this point in your life. We then will ask you to tell us a little about your 
important goal at this time. 
  
1.       Deciding your own actions -- not being under other’s influence. 
2.       Being committed to equality, justice, and protection for all people. 
3.       Success according to social standards 
4.       Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions 
5.       Being a reliable and trustworthy member of your group 
  
We are interested in perceptions of your goals. 
  
Please select what you feel is your most important goal at this point in time. Several of the listed 
goals may be important to you, but please select the most important one for you right now. Please 
type this goal in the box below. 
 
Please explain a little bit why this goal is most important to you, personally. 
 
Now, please share with us how you physically feel when you think about why this goal is important 
to you.  How do you feel? What emotions do you have? 
 
Affirmation other: 
 
The following is a list of goals that many people have at different times. As part of a personality 
measure we are validating, we would like you to look at these goals and think about which one is 
LEAST important to you at this point in your life. We then will ask you to tell us a little about your 
least important goal at this time. 
  
1.       Deciding your own actions -- not being under other’s influence. 
2.       Being committed to equality, justice, and protection for all people. 
3.       Success according to social standards 
4.       Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions 
5.       Being a reliable and trustworthy member of your group 
  
We are interested in perceptions of others’ goals. 
  
Please select what you feel is your least important goal at this point in time. Several of the listed 
goals may be not be very important to you, but please select the least important one for you right 
now. Please type this goal in the box below. 
 
Please explain why this goal might be personally important for someone else. 
 
Now, please share with us how you think someone else would physically feel when he/she thinks 
about why this goal is important to him/her.  How would he/she feel? What emotions would he/she 
have? 
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APPENDIX F: TRAIT ANXIETY (STAI-T) 
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APPENDIX G: STATE ANXIETY (STAI-S) 
 
  
 
 
 
  
42 
APPENDIX H: ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM SCALE (RSE) 
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APPENDIX I: NEUROTICISM—EYSENK’S PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE-
REVISED SHORT FORM (EPQR-S) 
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 APPENDIX J: LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE (LCS) 
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APPENDIX K: NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY-16 (NPI-16) 
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APPENDIX L: THE MEANING IN LIFE QUESTIONNAIRE (MLQ)
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APPENDIX M: THE EMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO UNCERTAINTY SCALE (UR-E) 
Following are some statements which regard different ways of reacting to situations. 
Please read each one carefully and circle the one alternative which you feel is most like 
you. The alternatives are as follows: 
 
1=Never, 2=Sometimes, 3=Often, 4=Always 
 
1) I tend to give up easily when I don’t clearly understand a situation 
2) Sudden changes make me feel upset  
3) When making a decision, I am deterred by the fear of making a mistake  
4) When the future is uncertain, I generally expect the worst to happen  
5) Facing uncertainty is a nerve wracking experience  
6) I get worried when a situation is uncertain  
7) Thinking about uncertainty makes me feel depressed  
8) Uncertainty frightens me  
9) When I can’t clearly discern situations, I get apprehensive  
10) When I’m not certain about someone’s intensions towards me, 
I often become upset or angry  
11) When uncertain about what to do next, I tend to feel lost  
12) I feel anxious when things are changing  
13) When a situation is unclear, it makes me feel angry  
14) I get really anxious if I don’t know what someone thinks about me  
15) I am hesitant when it comes to making changes  
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APPENDIX N: OUTPUT DATA FOR SCSRFQ 
 
Dependent 
Variable:  
SCSRFQ2mea
n 
      
Parameter B 
Std. 
Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept 3.111 .063 49.061 .000 2.986 3.237 .941 
UNC0_AFF1 -.122 .090 -1.359 .176 -.300 .055 .012 
SELF0_OTHER1 -.090 .086 -1.043 .299 -.261 .081 .007 
ZSCSRFQ1mean .887 .057 15.491 .000 .773 1.000 .615 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 .273 .125 2.191 .030 .027 .520 .031 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZSCSRFQ1mean .045 .083 .535 .593 -.120 .209 .002 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
ZSCSRFQ1mean .064 .089 .720 .473 -.111 .239 .003 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZSCSRFQ1mean 
-.302 .130 -2.316 .022 -.560 -.044 .035 
ZEUSmean -.065 .076 -.865 .389 -.215 .084 .005 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
ZEUSmean .085 .100 .845 .399 -.113 .283 .005 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZEUSmean -.025 .092 -.270 .788 -.206 .157 .000 
ZSCSRFQ1mean * 
ZEUSmean .007 .061 .109 .914 -.115 .128 .000 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZEUSmean 
.152 .131 1.158 .249 -.107 .411 .009 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZSCSRFQ1mean * 
ZEUSmean 
-.045 .082 -.551 .582 -.206 .116 .002 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
ZSCSRFQ1mean * 
ZEUSmean 
-.100 .085 -1.186 .238 -.267 .067 .009 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZSCSRFQ1mean * 
ZEUSmean 
.014 .124 .109 .913 -.231 .258 .000 
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APPENDIX O: OUTPUT DATA FOR ASGS 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable:  
ASGS2mea
n 
      
Parameter B 
Std. 
Error t Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Intercept 2.232 .119 18.836 .000 1.998 2.466 .703 
UNC0_AFF1 .079 .169 .467 .641 -.254 .412 .001 
SELF0_OTHER1 .129 .163 .793 .429 -.192 .450 .004 
ZASGS1mean .948 .146 6.485 .000 .659 1.237 .219 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 -.027 .233 -.118 .906 -.487 .432 .000 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZASGS1mean .154 .174 .884 .378 -.190 .498 .005 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
ZASGS1mean .020 .221 .089 .929 -.416 .455 .000 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZASGS1mean 
-.099 .268 -.368 .713 -.627 .430 .001 
ZEUSmean -.140 .133 -1.052 .295 -.404 .123 .007 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
ZEUSmean .365 .182 2.003 .047 .005 .725 .026 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZEUSmean .193 .171 1.128 .261 -.145 .531 .008 
ZASGS1mean * 
ZEUSmean -.075 .171 -.436 .663 -.413 .264 .001 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZEUSmean 
-.600 .243 -2.471 .015 -1.080 -.120 .039 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZASGS1mean * 
ZEUSmean 
-.048 .181 -.262 .793 -.406 .310 .000 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
ZASGS1mean * 
ZEUSmean 
.290 .249 1.166 .245 -.201 .781 .009 
UNC0_AFF1 * 
SELF0_OTHER1 * 
ZASGS1mean * 
ZEUSmean 
-.346 .282 -1.225 .223 -.904 .212 .010 
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